<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Geopolitics on Bogdan Buduroiu</title><link>https://buduroiu.com/zh/topics/geopolitics/</link><description>Recent content in Geopolitics on Bogdan Buduroiu</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>zh-TW</language><copyright>All text licensed is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:38 +0300</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://buduroiu.com/zh/topics/geopolitics/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>「和平統一」根本說不通</title><link>https://buduroiu.com/zh/blog/peaceful-unification-makes-no-sense/</link><pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:38 +0300</pubDate><guid>https://buduroiu.com/zh/blog/peaceful-unification-makes-no-sense/</guid><description>&lt;!-- 中文版註記:此為 index.md 的台灣在地化譯寫。內容與論點與英文版一致,僅將行文調整為台灣政論的書寫習慣。引註鍵與英文版共用 data/references.yaml。 --&gt;
&lt;p&gt;近來在關注台海情勢的圈子裡,流傳著一類文章。平心而論,這類論述有相當的分析份量,對局勢的判讀也夠犀利,值得認真接招,而不是被口號式地罵回去。它的論證大致如下:現狀是一座終將潰決的堰塞湖;中國的相對實力只增不減;美國已經從保護者變成收保護費的,還順手把台積電的最先進製程搬去亞利桑那;既然如此,負責任、不感情用事的做法,就是趁台灣手上還有籌碼的時候,先把條件談下來。&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;我認為這個診斷是對的。全部都對。現狀&lt;em&gt;確實&lt;/em&gt;在惡化。華府的行為&lt;em&gt;確實&lt;/em&gt;越來越像在予取予求&lt;label for="sn-peaceful-unification-makes-no-sense-0" class="margin-toggle sidenote-number" aria-label="Show note"&gt;&lt;/label
&gt;&lt;input type="checkbox" id="sn-peaceful-unification-makes-no-sense-0" class="margin-toggle" /&gt;&lt;span class="sidenote"&gt;美國商務部長盧特尼克(Howard Lutnick)要求把先進晶片產能的一半移到美國本土&lt;span class="citation"&gt;[&lt;span class="cite-item"&gt;&lt;a href="#ref-lutnick2025"&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card" aria-hidden="true"&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-title"&gt;U.S. Commerce head Lutnick wants Taiwan to help America make 50% of its chips locally&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-meta"&gt;Howard Lutnick, interviewed by CNBC · 2025&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-venue"&gt;CNBC&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-note"&gt;The &amp;quot;50-50&amp;quot; framing, 30 September 2025. Taipei publicly rejected it the following day (Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun, 1 October 2025); no such agreement exists.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
。為了不讓規劃中的北京峰會生變,而扣住一筆國會早已非正式放行的130億美元防空軍售&lt;span class="citation"&gt;[&lt;span class="cite-item"&gt;&lt;a href="#ref-wong2026"&gt;2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card" aria-hidden="true"&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-title"&gt;Taiwan Arms Sale Approved by Congress Is Delayed as Trump Plans Visit to Beijing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-meta"&gt;Edward Wong and Robert Jimison · 2026&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-venue"&gt;The New York Times&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="cite-card-note"&gt;27 February 2026. A package worth roughly US$13B, including Patriot interceptor missiles, NASAMS and anti-drone equipment, cleared informal review by the ranking members of the Senate and House committees in January 2026, then stalled at the State Department after the White House told agencies not to proceed ahead of a planned April summit in Beijing. Xi told Trump on 4 February that the US &amp;#34;must handle arms sales to Taiwan with extreme caution&amp;#34;; consulting Beijing before a sale cuts against the 1982 Six Assurances.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;,&lt;em&gt;不是&lt;/em&gt;盟友對待盟友的方式。1990年代,台灣的經濟規模約為中國的四成,而不是今天的百分之五,那&lt;em&gt;確實&lt;/em&gt;是一個相對份量大得多的時刻。&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>